





Benders, J.G.J.M.; Slomp, J.
Published in:




Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Link to publication in Tilburg University Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Benders, J. G. J. M., & Slomp, J. (2009). Struggling with solutions: A case study of using organisation concepts.
International Journal of Production Research, 47(18), 5237-5243.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 12. May. 2021
 
 
PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE
This article was downloaded by: [Benders, Jos]
On: 30 June 2009
Access details: Access Details: [subscription number 912820117]
Publisher Taylor & Francis
Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House,
37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK
International Journal of Production Research
Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:
http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t713696255
Struggling with solutions; a case study of using organisation concepts
Jos Benders a; Jannes Slomp b
a Tilburg University and Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, The Netherlands b Production Systems
Design Group, Faculty of Management and Organisation, University of Groningen, Groningen, The
Netherlands
First Published:January2009
To cite this Article Benders, Jos and Slomp, Jannes(2009)'Struggling with solutions; a case study of using organisation
concepts',International Journal of Production Research,47:18,5237 — 5243
To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/00207540802070959
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00207540802070959
Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.informaworld.com/terms-and-conditions-of-access.pdf
This article may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial or
systematic reproduction, re-distribution, re-selling, loan or sub-licensing, systematic supply or
distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden.
The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents
will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae and drug doses
should be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss,
actions, claims, proceedings, demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly
or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.
International Journal of Production Research
Vol. 47, No. 18, 15 September 2009, 5237–5243
Struggling with solutions; a case study of using organisation concepts
Jos Bendersa* and Jannes Slompb
aTilburg University and Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, The Netherlands; bProduction
Systems Design Group, Faculty of Management and Organisation, University of Groningen,
Groningen, The Netherlands
(Received 4 February 2008; final version received 17 March 2008)
Engineers contribute to the constant flow of new tools and organisation concepts.
These tend to be presented as solutions to existing organisational problems. These
solutions may become problems themselves, however. We present a longitudinal
case of how a truck manufacturer struggled with various similar and dissimilar
concepts in realising organisational changes. Whilst it may seem idiosyncratic, the
company’s struggles are probably typical for organisational change praxis.
Reflecting on the case, we present a model to help practitioners reflect on their use
of concepts and tools (thereby arguably contributing to the issue we signal).
Keywords: organisation concepts; self-managing teams; human factors; work
organisation; lean manufacturing; teamwork; world class manufacturing;
management fashion
1. Introduction
‘‘The Engineering Industry is as much subject to fashion as any other human activity, and a
study of its history reveals a succession of new ideas which have swept into the industrial
limelight, each being received as a panacea which is going to revolutionise production, only to
make way for some newer idea still. ‘Inspection’; ‘time and motion study’; ‘piece work’; ‘job
rating’; ‘stock control’; each has had its day, made some contribution to management thought,
and then receded from the limelight. Every idea has added one more layer to the multi decker
sandwich which is management today’’,
wrote John Burbidge more than half a century ago (Burbidge 1957, p. 175). If we are to
believe commentators such as Pascale (1990) and Eccles and Nohria (1992), the supply of
what Burbidge referred to as ‘panaceas’ has increased rather than decreased since the
1950s. Organisation concepts, tools matching those concepts and software packages are
constantly being introduced and promoted, and sometimes succeed in gaining substantial,
albeit often passing, attention among practitioners. If so, they are often called ‘fads’,
‘hypes’ or ‘fashions’. Practitioners face at least two difficulties in deciding whether or not
to use a particular concept or tool. In the first place, the fear of staying behind competitors
may lead to overly hasty adoption, without an adequate analysis of the concept’s
suitability. The adoption is then ‘solution driven’: a concept is intended to solve a problem,
but the issue is that the particular problem may not occur in the adopting organisation.
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Secondly, as concepts tend to lend themselves to various interpretations, practitioners
must decide how the concepts fit into their own local situation (Benders and Van Veen
2001, Giroux 2006).
As developers and users of tools, engineers need to reflect on the processes behind the
development, dissemination and application of concepts and tools. They appear
particularly susceptible to the inclination to develop new tools and hence be ‘innovative’.
John Burbidge himself is a case in point: his critical quote starts a book in which he
promoted the novel concept of ‘Standard Batch Production’ and later he was to become
the ‘Father of Group Technology’ (Suresh and Kay 1998). In general, ‘jumping to tools’
seems an engineering trait. The literature is replete with approaches that are held to be
‘new’; many papers in IJPR can serve as examples. For users other than the developers,
this may present a problem, as the addition of every single new concept and tool adds to
the already protuberant toolbox, thus further complicating the issue of finding the relevant
ideas for the job at hand.
In this paper, we first present a case where several concepts and ideas were applied over
a period of more than two decades. We focus on how one specific organisation struggled,
and still struggles, to use a host of concepts and tools. Although the description may come
across as hectic, it is arguably typical for how organisations attempt to make good use of
the steady flow of concepts and tools offered to them (Brunsson and Olsen 1997). We use
the case to illustrate a model that is intended to help practitioners apply organisation
concepts and tools.
2. Lean production at DAF
The following case is based on a variety of data gathered over the last two decades. The
first author started formal research in 1992, using existing informal contacts. Over the
course of time there were frequent contacts with several company representatives and
several Master students wrote their graduation thesis within the company. In addition,
publications in the business press as well as company-issued material were used.
DAF Trucks is a leading European truck manufacturer with production facilities in
Eindhoven, the Netherlands, and in Westerloo, Belgium. The first signs of attention to
‘lean production’ within DAF date back to the second half of 1990. In 1991, DAF publicly
announced the implementation of ‘lean production’ (LP). Top management embraced LP:
‘‘LP was the only idea that got the board enthusiastic in the last ten years’’, as a
respondent formulated it. This enthusiasm had much to do with DAF’s financial
difficulties at the time. These were to be mitigated, or even resolved, by introducing LP.
One respondent stated that the proposed implementation of LP served as a signal to
banks, indicating that DAF was seriously trying to solve its problems and was still
creditworthy. At the time, DAF became increasingly dependent on the banks for a
continuous supply of short-term credit (Van Oorschot 1996).
LP was promoted forcefully by the member of the Board of Directors responsible for
manufacturing. One of his subordinate managers was given the assignment of introducing
LP in the organisation. LP’s main feature was ‘head count reduction’ (Van Oorschot
1996). The man in charge of ‘lean production’ reportedly had as a motto: ‘‘I shall eliminate
every job of which I do not understand the job description’’. On November 20, 1990,
DAF, the unions and the works’ council reached agreement on cutting the workforce twice
by 6% in 1990 and 1991. In September 1992, a board member announced publicly that the





















































first landmark had been reached in early 1992 and that DAF would be ‘lean’ by the end of
1993. The 1991 annual report stated that a ‘‘lean enterprise culture’’ was to be
implemented in ‘‘all aspects of the organisation’’. For the years 1992–1994, an additional
headcount reduction of 1600 people (approximately 12% of the total workforce) was
announced (Vloet 1993). The focus was on directly visible elements. One respondent put it
as follows: ‘‘one had understood LP’s slimness, but failed to understand its suppleness’’; he
meant that there was hardly any attempt to start working as prescribed in LP textbooks,
but that LP was only used to reduce staff numbers.
There are no indications that DAF at that time had worked out a change program to
tailor the generic concept of LP to its own organisation. When asked what DAF’s version
of lean production constituted, the company’s spokesman pointed out that the concept
entailed ‘‘doing more with less staff’’ and that there were substantial cuts in indirect
departments, but that there was no overall company view.
Besides delayering and downsizing, all kinds of change projects continued to be carried
out, yet now often presented as part of the endeavour to become ‘lean’. Many managers
felt there were many similarities between the previous sociotechnical change program of
the 1980s and LP. Vloet (1993) interviewed 12 managers at different levels in
manufacturing departments. He concluded that, with the exception of three items, DAF
managers largely agreed with what MST constitutes. The perceived similarities made it
possible to carry out change projects under the label of lean production that were largely
inspired by an earlier change program. The existing knowledge of, and experience with,
change processes was carried over in the interpretations and projects in the ‘lean period’.
These largely identical interpretations can be understood how prima facie the concepts
seem to share similarities such as the stress on flow production, team-based working and
fewer hierarchical levels.
At the same time, a project that clearly fits into lean production was carried out, the
‘Single-Minute-Exchange-of-Die’ project for the heavy presses (Vroomen 1992). This,
however, was an isolated project, and not incorporated in a ‘lean’ design philosophy.
Similar efforts had been conducted 10 years earlier (see, more elaborately, Benders (1999)).
All these changes were ultimately unsuccessful in diverting a formal bankruptcy in
1993. However, this did not mean the end of the company. It continued on a smaller basis.
In 1996, it was taken over by the US truck manufacturer Paccar and DAF Trucks has been
a wholly owned subsidiary since then. The take-over meant improved access to financial
resources and investment in new product development and machinery, and organisational
change programs were initiated on a substantial scale. ‘World Class Manufacturing’
became the new banner under which improvement activities were started. Many staff went
on Six Sigma training programs. These contributed to quality improvement initiatives
throughout the company. Toyota-trained consultants were involved in setting up
programs and monitoring progress. In 2006, a brochure entitled ‘DAF Production
System’ was circulated (in the Summer of 2007, this was renamed ‘Paccar Production
System’). It communicated in an easily understandable fashion some key ideas of the
Toyota Production System to all DAF personnel, most notably shop floor employees. It
contains all key insights from the Toyota Production System: standardised operating
procedures, continuous improvement, zero defects, the elimination of waste and buffers,
continuous flow production and collaborative working.
The combined result of all changes has been impressive in productivity terms: the
number of trucks produced increased by a factor of 3.5 between 1993 and 2006, whilst the
number of employees has only increased slightly. The company has succeeded in realising





















































this within the existing premises, and is further raising the capacity of its production lines.
This does not mean that the basic lean notions are institutionalised throughout the
organisation (Olde Monnickhoff 2006). Witteveen (2007) even reported that, in a pilot cell
where continuous improvement was experimented with, shop-floor employees did not
conform to some standard operation procedures as they doubted their efficacy, whereas
the key idea of continuous improvement is that such an issue is reported as an
improvement opportunity. The use of standardised operation procedures is not yet
common in all parts of the manufacturing process. Therefore, a crucial basis for
continuous improvement à la Toyota is not yet commonplace, despite the presence of
many persons holding Six Sigma belts. Many difficulties come down to inconsistencies: the
Toyota Production System is a complex whole of basic notions and concrete techniques.
Many managerial actions at DAF are inconsistent with part of the Paccar Production
System, leading to contradictory signals to shop-floor members. For instance, at the end of
the month the stress on achieving production targets often leads to the violation of system
principles such as carefully working according to standard operating procedures. Recently,
it was suggested to create procedures to signal such inconsistencies, so that managers
become aware that their own actions often contradict the ideals of the Paccar Production
System (Witteveen 2007).
3. Conclusions: on using concepts
The DAF case illustrates how organisation concepts may be used to start change
programs. It also shows that organisational change tends to be a cumbersome process. The
greater the changes, and the more internal parties involved, the greater chance that
interests are affected, resistance occurs and the program falters. Failure is often attributed
to the concept used, and scepticism or even cynicism concerning a specific concept or even
organisational change in general is likely to emerge. In the DAF case, the term ‘lean’
became contaminated as it is associated with the traumatic events of 1991–1993; within
DAF, the term is still associated with large-scale lay-offs. In such a case, the concept used
to start the program easily ‘‘wears out through use’’ (Benders and Van Veen 2001): it
becomes associated with failure and may no longer be used to mobilise internal parties to
change. If this happens on a considerable scale, the message of failure spreads and the
concept may fall into disrepute. If so, this creates opportunities on the supply side:
commercial actors such as management gurus and consultants find it increasingly difficult
to generate income from the concept in question, and may start to ‘innovate’: come up
with ‘new’ concepts to satisfy the need for fresh and uncontaminated labels. As the DAF
case makes clear, there may be good reasons to shed one label and replace it by another,
whilst retaining core insights. The succession of World Class Manufacturing and later the
DAF/Paccar Production System exemplifies this: their core ideas are identical. Exactly
because concepts are used and changes occur, labels ‘wear out’ and need replacement. This
erosion is strictly local and thus of paramount importance within such a context. One
should not throw away the baby with the bathwater, however. Local erosion does not
affect the ‘classic value’ of the underlying ideas. Distinguishing between labels and the
underlying notions allows practitioners and academics alike to separate bathwater from
babies. Only in that case may one accumulate knowledge: recognise that earlier, and
‘locally failed’ concepts, may contain a core upon which to build under a different banner,
rather than shedding the ideas altogether.





















































One may reflect on tool use by relating tools to the concepts underpinning them.
Figure 1 shows a model distinguishing four different situations of the use and non-use of
lean tools and the underlying concepts. The first quadrant, where both the concepts and
tools are absent, may seem redundant. However, on a closer look this situation warrants
attention. The issue is to consider whether or not the concepts or tools are suitable for
resolving existing issues. Organisational mimicry or essentially ‘keeping up with the
Joneses’ is a strong driver for adoption, especially when the concept is fashionable. In a
certain way, DAF benefited from LP’s fashionability in the early 1990s by signalling to
creditors that it was still modern and thus worth lending money to. In the case of ‘lean’, the
matter is more complicated. The adjective is often understood as a synonym for ‘superior
performance’. This renders the word ‘lean’ essentially meaningless: if any way of
improving performance is called ‘lean’, the specific philosophy of the Toyota Production
System becomes but one way of doing so, and its specific strengths lose their
attractiveness. Thus, ‘lean’ needs to be considered as a means of achieving a goal,
rather than becoming a goal in itself. The literature on management fashions shows that,
in practice, this danger is often materialised. At the same time, however, DAF Trucks’
initial use of ‘lean’ shows that even such decoupled use can very well be functional.
We labelled the use of a concept without the matching tools ‘clumsy’. This clumsiness
may easily be remedied by looking for, or even developing, appropriate tools. A key
insight, however, is to learn from existing knowledge, i.e. to use available tools. The ‘not
invented here’ syndrome may lead to the reinvention of the wheel (Benders and Vermeulen
2002). If and only if such tools may not be found, it makes sense to develop them
internally. The abundance of various labels to disseminate the basic notions of the Toyota
Production System alone suggests that this form of waste may be more widespread than
commonly assumed (as an aside: one manifestation of avoiding waste is to keep tools as
simple as possible. This may not appeal to engineers wanting to display their sophisticated
skills, yet it can be argued to be in the true Toyota spirit. For example, during a site visit to
Toyota’s most modern Japanese plant, one of the authors was guided by a senior manager
who proudly showed how second-hand material, partly from bicycles, had been used in
constructing a device to supply complex and hard-to-handle parts to the final
assembly line).
Using tools without the underlying concept is called ‘unfocused’ in Figure 1. An
outspoken critic of this unfocused use is Steven Spear (Spear and Bowen 1999). The risk is
that such applications are unfocused. Much of the history of using various approaches at
DAF Trucks seems to fit here: concepts and tools are applied continuously throughout the
factory to realise local improvements. Without being embedded in a larger whole, the
Concepts
NO YES
Tools NO suitable? clumsy 
YES unfocused aligned
Figure 1. The use and non-use of lean tools and concept.





















































potential gains of such improvements will only be partially captured. At another level, the
use of tools and approaches may have unanticipated consequences which could have been
foreseen had the larger context been considered. This is one reason for the early failure of
quality control circles to diffuse widely. Improvements due to suggestions from
participating employees initially led to efficiency gains and substantially higher labour
productivity, where the latter were materialised by firing shop-floor employees. This, quite
naturally, turned out to be an effective way of stopping their colleagues contributing
further (Cole 1995, Hill 1995). However, a counter-argument is that working out a
coherent change program may take an extended and strenuous process, whereas an
abundance of local improvement projects may, even without being embedded in a larger
framework, still all contribute to efficiency gains and therefore be beneficial.
The simultaneous presence of both concept and matching tools or ‘aligned use’ is,
obviously, an ideal. DAF Trucks launched various attempts to do this, most recently in the
form of the DAF/Paccar Production System. Yet ideals are often hard to reach. Within
Toyota Motors, the philosophy was clear in the 1930s. It then took decades to work this
out in a systematic approach (Ohno 1988, Holweg 2007). Implementing and putting this
into practice is a continuous and difficult process, with ups and downs (Besser 1996,
Benders and Morita 2004, Pardi 2007). Over the course of the last three decades, the basic
ideas behind the Toyota Production System, including continuous improvement and flow
production, have been published under a wide variety of labels, with ‘lean’ arguably being
the most prominent. Before implementing such a concept, practitioners must realise the
complexities involved in implementation and the associated pitfalls. At the organisational
level, a few critical issues need to be considered.
(1) What concrete purpose is ‘lean’ going to serve?
(2) How is this going to be worked out in an organisation-wide change program?
(3) How can such a generic program be put to use in concrete change projects within
the organisation?
In brief, practitioners need concepts and tools, but their well-considered use is as crucial as
their availability.
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